Abstract-Proof of security of cryptographic protocols theoretically establishes the strength of a protocol and the constraints under which it can perform, it does not take into account the overall design of the protocol. In the past model checking has been successfully applied to classical cryptographic protocols to weed out design flaws which would have otherwise gone unnoticed. Quantum cryptographic protocols differ from their classical counterparts, in their ability to detect the presence of an eavesdropper. Although unconditional security has been proven for both BB84 [3] and B92 [4] protocols, in this paper we show that identifying an eavesdropper's presence is constrained on the number of qubits exchanged. We first model the protocols in CQP [10] [8] and then explain the mechanism by which we have translated this into a PRISM model. We mainly focus on the protocols' ability to detect an active eavesdropper and the extent to which an eavesdropper can retrieve the shared key without being detected by either party. We then conclude by comparing the performance of the protocols.
I. Introduction
Quantum cryptographic protocols have garnered much acclaim in the last two decades for their ability to provide unconditional security, which is not practically assured by their classical counterparts. Commercial availability of quantum infrastructure in the last decade has placed even more emphasis on developing methodologies to ascertain the reliability of protocols in practice. Even though, protocols are theoretically secure, our experience with classical protocols has shown that security can be compromised during implementation. Since modelling, analysing and verifying classical protocols have worked so well, developing techniques along these lines seems prudent for quantum cryptographic protocols as well.
The cornerstone of quantum cryptographic protocols is the inherent probabilistic nature. Unlike classical protocols which accommodates a passive eavesdropper, wherein the eavesdropper can copy the bits and analyse them later, quantum protocols mandate an active eavesdropper. This constraint is promulgated by the no-cloning [11] theorem which handicaps the eavesdropper from copying qubits. To extract information from the qubits an eavesdropper will inevitably resort to measuring them in a basis which might be different from the encoding basis and thereby alters the state of the qubit. This action is probabilistic in nature. Moreover, quantum protocols also involve both classical and quantum channels. Therefore we need a language that is capable of modelling probabilistic phenomenon and also takes into account both classical and quantum communications.
Communicating Quantum Processes (CQP) [10] is a language developed with the expert purpose of modelling quantum protocols. CQP uses the communication primitives of pi-calculus [9] and has capabilities for applying unitary operators, performing measurements, and a static type system that differentiates between classical and quantum communications. Hence CQP seems an obvious choice for modelling quantum protocols. Reasoning along the same lines, PRISM allows us to model probabilistic transitions, as we show later, this allows to seamlessly translate a CQP model into a PRISM model.
Previous work on analysis of BB84 by Papanikolaou [5] has reasoned about the probability of detecting an eavesdropper and corroborates the claim made by Mayers in his proof of unconditional security of BB84. However, this work does not model BB84 in CQP. We first model BB84 in CQP, conver the CQP model into PRSIM and check the validity of the observations made by Papanikolaou [5] . We then proceed to show that B92's eavesdropping detection capabilities can be reasoned along the same lines.
To ensure brevity we have refrained from explaining Quantum Mechanical primitives like unitary operators, measurements and no-cloning theorem. One good resource is Nielsen and Chuang's work [7] . Also, we have only provided an elementary introduction to CQP, only to the extent to which we use it in this paper. A better and complete resource would be Thimothy Davidson's [8] doctoral thesis.
II. Preliminaries
We are going to briefly explain quantum measurement, and working of BB84 and B92 protocols.
A. Quantum Measurement
It is inherent with any quantum mechanical system that any measurement done on the system will induce some arXiv:1612.03706v1 [cs.CR] 9 Dec 2016 irreversible disturbances. We are going to rely on this property of qubits heavily in any quantum cryptographic protocols.
Any quantum system can be represented as a vector in an n dimensional complex Hilbert space. Measuring this quantum system can only give a set of priviliged results namely those associated with the basis vectors of the state space. For example, consider a 2-dimensional complex Hilbert spcae with |0 and |1 as basis vectors. Lets say the vector |ψ = α. |0 + β. |1 describes the system. If we try to measure the system in the basis {0, 1}, then the system changes to a new state, either |ψ = |0 or |ψ = |1 permanently. It has a probability |α| 2 of changing into |ψ = |0 and a probability |β| 2 of changing into |ψ = |1 . Also, |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1. We can also measure the system in whichever basis that we choose. Lets measure the system in another basis {+, −}, where
, then the quantum state can be represented as |ψ =
(|− ). Measuring this system in the basis {+, −} will yield |+ and |− with probability 
B. BB84 QKD protocol
A and B want to establish a secret for secure communication. A sends the encoding of some bits in the +,×basis to B on the quantum channel. B then chooses a random sequences of bases and measures the qubit sent by A in that basis. If the basis of Alice and Bob are equal then the B obtains the classical bit chosen by Alice other wise she randomly gets {0, 1}. A and B then use the classical channel to exchange the basis and the corresponding measurements of qubits to decide upon a shared key or to detect the presence of an eavesdropper.
C. Understanding B92
Unlike BB84 where each classical bit has two different encoding depending on the basis used, B92 has only one. In other words there is a one to one correspondence between the classical bits and qubits exchanged. If Alice wants to send a classical bit 0 to Bob she sends →and if she wants to send 1 she sends . The rest of the steps involved are the same as in BB84.
D. Eavesdropping Attacker
As mentioned earlier, whenever Eve measures the qubits that are in transit to Bob from Alice, she makes a permanent change to the state of qubits if she doesn't use the same basis as that of Alice. In BB84 protocol if on some qubits both Alice and Bob use the same basis to encode and measure but Bob decodes a classical bit different from what Alice encoded, suggests the presence of Eve. In B92 as well, Alice and Bob should obtain the opposite results when the encoding basis is the same, then an attacker is present. We are assuming the qubit channel shared by all the participants noiseless.
III. Formalising in CQP
A brief overview of CQP calculus is provided and then we proceed to formalise both the protocols in CQP. An example of BB84-Bit Commitment Protocol in CQP [10] was give by Simon and Gay and our formalisation uses the same techniques.
A protocol at any given point of time has multiple participants, like Alice and Bob which are legitimate entities involved and also adversaries like Eve. These entities are collectively known as agents. Agents communicate with each other via communication channels to exchange information. The working of the agents is encapsulated by processes. Every agent has more than one process, and at any given time its possible that more than one process is in action. These processes can be reasonably thought of as states in finite state automatons and every process transitions to another or terminates. CQP allows us to impose a probabilistic distribution across these transitions. Also processes in CQP can be parametrised.
1) channels are declared by the new keyword.
For example to declare a new qubit channel, we write (new qubitChannel:ˆ[Qbit]), where Qbit is the data type qubitChannel is constrained to and "ˆ" identifies it as a channel. 2) variables can be declared within a process like so, (qbit q). 3) Process Output: c! [x] .P i+1 to send the data stored by variable x along channel c and then proceed with process P i+1 . 4) Process Input: c? [x] .P i+1 to receive along channel c and then proceed with process P i+1 . 5) Process action: e.P i+1 evaluates expression e and then proceeds with process P i+1 6) Process decision: ifethenP i+1 elseP i+2 if the expression e evaluates to true then proceed with process P i+1 else P i+2 7) Terminate: P i .0 the process terminates after P i .
A. Formalising BB84
We identify that Alice, Bob are the primary agents of the protocol and to analyse the effects of an eavesdropper Eve becomes an agent of the system as well. As described above channels can only transport messages of a particular type. We have qubitChannel to transport qubits, intChannel for integers and decisionChannel, decisionFlagChannel, randomBitChannel for bits. Technically one bit channel would suffice.
However having two different channels that are used at two different stages in the protocol helps us to convert the CQP-model into PRISM as will be elaborated in the next section. We have also made use of List type, with its associated functions of hd, tl, [] and @ for reading the first element, dropping the first element, an empty list and placing data at the tail of the list respectively. The use of these functions is demonstrated by Gay et al. [10] .
• System is parameterized by a bitList, which constitutes the classical (see Figure 1) . bits that need to be exchanged between Alice and Bob • Random agent creates a random bit and sends it via the radomBitChannel • Alice first sends the length of the number of bits to be exchanged with Bob, i.e the length of bitList.
• Upon sending the length of the bit list, Alice continues with the process AliceSend. This is a recursive process which terminates after sending all the bits in bitList. AliceSend first receives a random bit from randomBitChannel, if the value received is equal to zero then the qubit q is encoded in the rectilinear basis else it is encoded in the diagonal basis. (qubit q) creates a new qubit q initialised to |0 . Hence an operation of X on q to create |1 and X or X, H to convert it into |+ and |− respectively. AliceSend then sends the qubit q via qubitChannel to be received by Bob. The random bits are stores in encodeBitList to be used later when both the entities decide upon the key.
• Bob receives the length of the bitList and then continues with BobReceive process. Like AliceSend, this is a recursive process which terminates after receiving all the bits. BobReceive then uses a random bit from randomBitChannel, if this bit is zero then Bob measures the received qubit in the rectilinear basis else in the diagonal basis. We used a list that stores a couplet, where we store the random bit and the corresponding measurement.
• After exchanging the qubits, Alice and Bob continue with AliceReveal and BobFinal respectively. AliceReveal sends the basis that she used for encoding via the decisionBitChannel. BobFinal upon receiving this basis elements checks whether the basis he measured in the same as of that of Alice in which case, he sends an acknowledgement via decisionFlagChannel to Alice and the corresponding bit he measured. Alice checks if the measurement that Bob made is the same as that of the intended bit. Since we are dealing with channels without any noise, if the measurement Bob made does not match, Alice straight away confirms the presence of an attacker and sends an eveDetect flag to Bob.
B. Formalising B92
Since B92 and BB84 only differ in how they encode the qubits, we can modify the CQP formalisation of BB84 for B92 (see Figure 2) . AliceSend does not encode the qubit in a random basis. If the bitList element is equal to zero then she sends |0 else if the element in equal to one then |+ is exchanged. With few modifications to AliceSend in BB84, we can adopt it model B92. These modifications are presented in Figure 2 .
IV. Modelling and Analysis in PRISM
Conversion from CQP to PRISM is a step by step process. This conversion for a subset of commands has been done by Ware in his Master's thesis [6] . We are going to use the same procedure (See Appendix for the PRISM models). In the previous section we have mentioned that we have used List type. Unfortunately a parallel for this type does not exist for PRISM. To overcome this handicap we will have to modify the model, in both the protocols the public discussion starts after both the parties have exchanged all the qubits. Instead in the PRISM model after every qubit exchange, both the parties proceed to exchange the encoding basis and measured bit to establish the validity of the qubit. This way we can ensure that the original characteristics of the protocol remain intact.
• all the channels in the CQP model are defined as global variables in the PRISM model. • when Eve is detected, both Alice and Bob cease to exchange any more qubits and reach their end state.
• like in the CQP model we do not create a module for Random, rather all the parties create their own random bits either zero or one with equal probability.
• after choosing a random basis to measure in there is a one-fourth probability of any of the four outcomes.
• the number of bits to be exchanged is set by N the global variable. We check the properties of the model by varying the value of N . Alice and Bob iterate constrained by the value N and are synchronised by the label loop.
• Alice and Bob modules terminate either after exchanging N qubits or after detecting Eve and are synchronised by stop.
A. Analysis of BB84
With the models we have made in PRISM we are going to show there is a non zero probability with which the eavesdropper can be detected and how this probability varies with the number of photons exchanged. PRISM is capable of calculating probabilities of the form P σ,Φ = P r{σ |= Φ}, i.e, given a PRISM model σ, we can calculate the probability with which the property Φ holds. Φ is expressed in PCTL. We have two models σ 1 and σ 2 for random-substitution and interceptresend, respectively. Both these models are parametrised by N the number of qubits that both the parties exchange.
Let P n ED = P r{σ n (N ) |= Φ 1 } for n ∈ {1, 2}, for the probability of eavesdropper detection and P n CM = P r{σ n (N ) |= Φ 2 } for n ∈ {1, 2} for the probability of the eavesdropper making correct measurements for more than half of the qubits. n = 1 for random-substitution and n = 2 for intercept resend. We also have N ∈ [1, 20], i.e, we start to find these probabilities starting from one qubit being exchanged to twenty. Φ 1 and Φ 2 are to be expressed in PCTL. Φ 1 is the PCTL formula corresponding to when the eavesdropper is detected. From the PRISM model for BB84 (in Appendix A), whenever an eavesdropper is detected Alice is in aliceState=15 and Bob is in state bobState=10. The corresponding expression for Φ 1 and their property expression in PRISM:
Similarly for Φ 2 which gives the probability of eavesdropper measuring more than half of the exchanged qubits correctly is TABLE II: Probability of eavesdropper measuring more than half of the qubits correct for BB84-QKD least squares algorithm for curve-fitting we have come up with the equation that best fits these probabilities. We observed that 
ED , the probability of eavesdropper getting detected is higher when the eavesdropper resorts to random-substitution.
Also it has to be noted that:
which suggests as the number of qubits exchanged increases so does the chances of detecting an eavesdropper. 
B. Analysis of B92
We use the same notations as in the previous subsection. The only change being the PCTL expressions. Referring to PRISM model for B92(Appendix B), eavesdropper is detected when aliceState=11 and bobState=10.
2 )] After using the curve fitting algorithm to approximate the results to an equation we have: 
We make the following obeservations:
Like the inferences made for BB84, the chances of detecting an eavesdropper increases with the number of qubits exchanged and also the number of correct measurements that an eavesdropper can make decreases exponentially with the number of qubits exchanged. But unlike in BB84, for B92 we have P 1 ED < P 2 ED , hence the probability of eavesdropper detection is higher during intercept-resend than in random substitution.
C. Comparison between BB84 and B92
Quite strangely we observe that with respect to random substitution type of attack, both the protocols perform identically. This is substantiated by the equations However with respect to intercept resend style attacks they differ markedly, as evidenced by Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 . B92 performs better in terms of eavesdropper detection as the probability approaches unity faster than B92 and in terms of decreased number of correct measurements that can be made by the eavesdropper. 
V. Conclusion
We have successfully modelled BB84 protocol in CQP, showed the process in which we have created PRISM models from the CQP models and analysed the properties using PCTL. We also corroborate the observations made in earlier research with our analysis. We then extended the technique to B92-QKD protocol and compare the performance of the two. We infer that B92 is more resilient against an eavesdropper, with its ability to take fewer qubits than BB84 in identifying an eavesdropper and then potentially reducing the number of correct measurements the eavesdropper can make.
